Archiv Ladislava Hejdánka | Kartotéka

Konrad Lorenz (1983)

Výše jsme snad dostatečně ukázali, že evoluce se může vydat z každého dosaženého vývojového stupně libovolným směrem; řídí se slepě každým nově se vynořujícím selekčním tlakem. Je však třeba si uvědomit, že v právě použitém pojmu evolučního „směru“ je obsažen nereflektovaný hodnotový soud. …
(7662, Odumírání lidskosti, Praha 1997, str. 34.)

Jean Brun (1961)

Les mathématiques traitent des êtres immuables mais non séparés (les figures des êtres immuables par leur essence, mais ils ne sont pas séparés car il n´y a pas de figures séparés de ce dont il y a figure, ni de nombres séparés des choses nombrées; cf. Phys. II 2 193 b 22 sq.); la physique traite des êtres qui on en eux-mêmes un principe de mouvement et qui sont par conséquent des êtres mobiles et séparés les uns des autres; quant à la métaphysique, elle s´occupe de l´Etre immobile et séparé (cf. Méta. E 1 1026 a 13; K 7 1064 a 28).
(6514, Aristote et le Lycée, P.U.F., Paris 1961, p. 51.)

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (-5 - +65)

Epistula LXXVIII.
Toto contra ille pugnet animo; vincetur, si cesserit, vincet, si se contra dolorem suum intenderit. Nunc hoc plerique faciunt, adtrahunt in se ruinam, cui obstandum est. Istud quod premit, quod inpendet, quod urget, si subducere te coeperis, sequetur et gravius incumbet; si contra steteris et obniti volueris, repelletur. …
[Let such a man fight against them with all his might: if he once gives way, he will be vanquished; but if he strives against his sufferings, he will conquer. As it is, however, what most men do is to drag down upon their own heads a falling ruin which they ought to try to support. If you begin to withdraw your support from that which thrusts toward you and totters and is ready to plunge, it will follow you and lean more heavily upon you; but if you hold your ground and make up your mind to push against it, it will be forced back. …]
(…., Ad Lucilium Epistulae morales, London 1970, p. 190 / 191.)

Paul Ricœur (1983)

(N.O.:) S Freudem se klade problém klamného vědomí, dokonce snad vědomí jakožto klamu.
P. Ricoeur: Ano, v jistém smyslu není tím podstatným problémem moderního myšlení problém omylu, nýbrž problém iluze. Celé naše úsilí spočívá v podstatě v tom, abychom znovu objevili cogito pomocí kritiky iluzí, abychom nahradili filosofii vědomí filosofií uvědomění. Jean Lacroix říkal, že „vědomí není žádnou daností, nýbrž úkolem“. Domnívám se, že tato problematika souvisí s problematikou frankfurtské školy. /19/ Horkheimerova a Adornova myšlenka je ta, že osvícenecká racionalita se neznala ve své schopnosti opovrhovat, manipulovat, klamat sebe samu.
(Filosofie důvěry, rozhovor v Le Nouvel Observateur 11.3.1983, česky in: 7128, Život, pravda, symbol. Praha 1993, s. 18.)

Aristotelés (-706)

... And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full reality consists. /562/ It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all men. We must not argue from a vicious an corrupt life, or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes. ... But if life itself is good and pleasant (...); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense-perception or thought); and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically good); and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels /564/ towards himself (for his friend is a second self) – then, just as man´s own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend´s existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore ...
(4361, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge (Ma)+London 1975, p. 561-64 –
IX.9, 1170a16 nn.)