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Rudyard Kipling ()

If
If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
But make allowence for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or being lied about, don’t deal in lies,
Or being hated don’t give way to hating,
And yet don’t look too good, nor talk too wise:
If you can dream – and not make dreams your master;
If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same;
If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
And stoop and build ’em up with worn-out tools:
If you can make one heap of all your winnings
And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,
And lose, and start again at your beginnings
And never breath a word about your loss;
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the Will which says to them: „Hold on!“
If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
Or walk with Kings – nor lose the common touch,
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds worth of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it,
And – which ist more – you’ll be a Man, my son!
(3699, Sixty Poems, London 1945, p. 111–12.)

Sirach ()

30Neodporúj pravdě nižádným obyčejem, a za klam svého neumění styď se. … 33 Až do smrti zasazúj se o pravdu, a Pán Bůh bojovati bude za tebe.
Sirach, 4, 30-31
(7437, Apokryfy, překlad Kralických, Praha 1952, str. 220.)

Sirach ()

20Nesnadnějších věcí nad chopnost svou nezpytuj nesmyslně, a k čemuž nepostačuje síla tvá, toho nevyhledávej nemoudře. 21Cožť poručeno, o tom přemyšlúj pobožně; není zajisté potřebí tobě skrytých věcí očima spatřovati. 22Zbytečnými řečmi svými daremně se nezaměstknáv ej. 23Neboť více ukázáno jest, nežli rozum lidský chopit může.
Sirach, 3, 20-23
(7437, Apokryfy, překlad Kralických, Praha 1952, str. 218.)

Friedrich Nietzsche (1987)

7 [63]
Muß nicht alle Philosophie endlich die Voraussetzungen, auf denen die Bewegung der Vernunft ruht, ans Licht bringen? Unseren Glauben an das Ich, als an eine Substanz, als an die einzige Realität, nach welcher wir überhaupt den Dingen Realität zusprechen? Der älteste „Realismus“ kommt zuletzt ans Licht: zu gleicher Zeit, wo die ganze religiöse Geschichte der Menschheit sich wiedererkennt als Geschichte vom Seelen-Aberglauben. Hier ist eine Schranke: unser Denken selbst involvirt jenen Glauben (mit seiner Unterscheidung von Substanz-Accidens, Thun, Thäter usw.), ihn fahren lassen heißt nicht-mehr-denken-dürfen. /318/
Daß aber ein Glaube, so nothwendig er ist, zur Erhaltung von Wesen, nichts mit der Wahrheit zu thun hat, erkennt manz.B. selbst daran, daß wir an Zeit Raum und Bewegung glauben müssen, ohne uns gezwungen zu fühlen, hier absolute [+++]
(4582, Sämtl. Werke Bd. 12, Nachgel. Fragmente, München/Berlin/New York 1980, S. 318.)

www ()

Post subject: Can an actual occasion be felt more than once?
In Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, can an actual occasion be positively prehended (felt) by more than one actual occasion? I have been told that it can, but I can't see how this could be so:
An actual occasion reaches satisfaction in the concrescence of its being positively prehended by another actual occasion and becomes a superject (while it is the data or object for the prehending actual occasion which is, for itself, the subject of the concrescence), i.e., it is objectively immortalized in the prehending actual occasion. I think Whitehead says that every actual occasion is at the same time a subject and a superject, a subject-superject, but he also says that in reaching satisfaction, an actual occasion loses its nature as a subject and only retains a superject status. In a sense, the actual occasion seems to 'die' subjectively and only lives on in how it altered or affected the prehending actual occasion in the concrescence. So, I guess what I'm getting at is if it only lives on objectively as a 'feature' (this may not be a good word to use) of another actual occasion, how is it 'there' to be prehended by another actual occasion later?
Whitehead says that actual occasions don't change, they only perish. So, if it has a specific subjective aim, and it achieves this subjective aim in being prehended, and, as a result, becomes completely determinate, how is it able to later be a subject-superject again to be prehended by a different actual occasion?
I think I asked the same question about 5 or 6 times in different ways, I'm just trying to make sure I'm being sufilosoficiently clear, but if you read through the whole question, thanks for your patience! I'm going to start losing sleep over this question soon.
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Joined: 04 Nov 2004, Posts: 53, Location: Boston