This text presents a philosophical analysis of the concepts of “intuition” and “intuitiveness” within the context of scientific knowledge and human thought. Starting from Grygar’s observation regarding scientific concepts that lack intuitive representation, the author explores the fundamental distinction between abstract concepts and mental representations. A central theme is whether the human mind is capable of “intuiting” dynamic entities, such as events, actions, and processes, or whether our imagination is necessarily limited to static, timeless objects, or phenomena. The text suggests that while a conventional representation “places before” the mind something fixed and stable, an event, by its fluid nature, transcends such staticity and cannot be understood as a mere representation. The work thus opens a discussion on the need to redefine our understanding of intuition based on whether we allow for the possibility of perceiving change and movement themselves. This reflection is crucial for understanding the limits of human thinking when dealing with complex temporal phenomena that cannot be easily visualized through conventional mental images.