This text presents a critical reflection on Paul Ricoeur's lecture regarding the relationship between memory and the identity of the subject. The author engages with Ricoeur's assertion that the continuity of existence and the permanence of the self are ensured through memory. The central problem raised is the ontological status of memory as an action. The author argues that because remembering is an exercise of agency, it necessitates a pre-existing subject capable of performing such an action. To ensure its own continuity, the subject must "be" in a permanent sense, independent of any specific act of remembering. The abstract explores whether memory should be considered an inherent part of the subject's being rather than just an activity. It further questions the terminology used to describe the subject, specifically whether "existence" or "being" are appropriate categories. The text thus challenges the functionalist view of memory in identity formation, emphasizing the need to define the subject's ontological foundation prior to its cognitive functions.