This text examines the fundamental distinction between the problems of first philosophy and those of so-called second philosophies or specialized sciences. The central argument posits that problems within second philosophies are inherently unsolvable without recourse to specific solutions provided by first philosophy. Conversely, first philosophy remains an autonomous and independent discipline, capable of formulating and resolving its questions within its own framework, although it may utilize examples from other fields for illustrative purposes. The author emphasizes the necessity for first philosophy to develop its own conceptual apparatus, which should not be limited to traditional Greek conceptual frameworks. A crucial element of the discussion is the distinction between actual philosophical problems and the specific ways they are conceptually grasped, formulated, and manipulated by different disciplines. By maintaining this distinction, one avoids the erroneous identification of the diverse approaches used by first philosophy, second philosophies, and theoretical sciences, thereby clarifying the methodological structure and hierarchy of philosophical inquiry.