This text critically examines the relationship between the concepts of cause and motive within the context of human will, specifically addressing Kant's notion of the determining cause of the will. The author argues that if the will were caused in a traditional causal sense, it would cease to function as a true will. The fundamental difference lies in the fact that the will can oppose even powerful motives, whereas an effect cannot resist its cause. True will necessitates freedom and contingency, which are manifested through the subject's reactibility. A motive is not an objective force but rather requires the subject's consent or acceptance. The text challenges the existence of unambiguous causes in reality, suggesting they be replaced by probabilities and the activity of the subject. Since a subject can never be reduced to a mere object, their actions maintain at least a minimal degree of contingency. The paper concludes that the concept of causality is inherently contradictory and fails to account for the nature of the acting subject.