This seminar recording focuses on the concept of "representation" and its relation to intentional objects and concepts. The introductory part is partially damaged, but it continues with explanations using examples of intentional objects, such as a coin in Heidegger's work (criticizing his confusion between representation and reality), Plato's Phaedrus, and Kant. A key point is the distinction between an intentional object (e.g., a triangular geometric shape as a mental construct) and the concept through which we intend this object. It is emphasized that a single intentional object (e.g., an equilateral triangle) can be grasped by different concepts, while the mental construct itself often contains more than is explicitly intended. It is also discussed how the neglect of the level of intentional objects in traditional philosophy led to fundamental errors in the history of metaphysics. The recording concludes with a discussion after the main lecture has ended.