This text from 1967 offers a critical reflection on Edmund Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction. The author challenges Husserl's attempt to suspend belief in the existence of the world to reach a state of pure transcendental consciousness. It is argued that such pure consciousness is merely a result of hypostasis, leading to a mystified form of consciousness. The central critique is that one can only reduce a phenomenon as an object of consciousness, but not as a subject or its constituent. The process of reducing the structure of a phenomenon is viewed as an active engagement of consciousness. Rather than simplifying consciousness to a pure foundation, this act of reduction leads to the further complexification of the consciousness performing the task. Consequently, the text emphasizes the procedural and active nature of consciousness, which contradicts the static notion of attaining a pure form by simply setting aside the external world. This critique highlights an inherent contradiction in Husserl's method, where the attempt to isolate consciousness necessarily transforms the nature of the subject being examined.