This study analyzes the historical evolution of the concept of inertness in philosophy, from its ancient origins to Hegelian dialectics. Early Greek thinkers, such as Empedocles, understood basic elements as internally homogeneous and inert, governed by external forces of Love and Strife. Although Aristotle criticized the dualism of these forces, he continued to accept the idea of passive elements, influenced by the atomists. A shift in this reasoning is represented by Plato's conception of the soul as an internal source of movement and subsequently Aristotle's concept of energeia. In the modern era, vitalists opposed mechanistic reductionism with the idea of the vital force vis vitalis, yet they paradoxically left inanimate matter in its inert state. Even Leibniz's monads, with their isolated internal activity, did not overcome this paradigm. The real breakthrough was brought by G. W. F. Hegel, who rejected the absolute inertia of matter and emphasized the necessity of connecting inwardness and outwardness. Hegel's philosophy thus definitively overcomes the concept of inertness through an emphasis on internal activity and the dynamic nature of reality.