This text examines the definition of meontology and critically explores its relationship to scientific disciplines. The author emphasizes that despite the linguistic suffix –logy, meontology should not be understood as a science or a narrowly defined academic field. The central argument is that meontology must remain a purely philosophical discipline, which implies that it represents philosophy as a whole at all times, rather than just a fragment of it. The author applies the same principle to other disciplines such as ontology, gnoseology, or philosophical logic. The work proposes understanding these disciplines not as isolated sciences, but as specific philosophical viewpoints or perspectives. While these perspectives focus on a particular set of problems and their interconnections, they always do so with regard to a broader context, the true significance of which emerges precisely through the chosen point of view. Meontology is thus presented as an integral part of philosophical inquiry that maintains its complexity even when focusing on the specific issues of non-being.