This text explores the ontological definition of the term subjectivity and its relationship to the internal world or internality. The author questions what exactly we mean by the word subjective and at what level of existence subjectivity begins to emerge. A key distinction is made between mere internality—which the author attributes even to elementary particles like atoms—and true subjectivity. While internality lacks intentionality and represents only a tendency toward externalization without the capacity for autonomous action, subjectivity is defined as an active form of internality. The author argues that subjectivity cannot be understood as mere passivity, as pure passivity is virtually non-existent in a dynamic world; even reactions to external stimuli constitute a form of activity by a specific subject. The text provides a philosophical insight into the nature of the subject as an agent that connects the internal dimension with external influence through intentional activity, thereby distinguishing itself from mere event-based occurrences that lack a subject-driven origin.