This text provides a thorough analysis of the concepts of "nothing" and "nothingness" from a philosophical perspective. The author begins with the premise that the word "nothing" is typically used merely as a tool for negation, which originally serves to refine a specific positive assertion within a given context. However, if this negation is extended unconditionally to encompass all circumstances and relations, it inevitably loses its functional purpose for clarification and instead leads to increasing indeterminacy and ambiguity. Consequently, the article focuses on investigating the legitimacy of using these terms in such a broad sense and seeks to uncover their potential positive meaning. The author raises fundamental questions about whether it is possible to properly establish the concept of "nothingness" as something at least partially determinate and whether it can be integrated into logical connections with other concepts. The aim is to attempt to define a corresponding intentional model, whether as an object or a non-object, and thus specify the internal content of nothingness within philosophical inquiry. The text encourages a reflection on the semantic and ontological boundaries of absolute negation.