This text examines Nietzsche’s irony towards the concept of the inner world, arguing that his rejection stems from two fundamental misconceptions. First, Nietzsche conflated the inner with the subjective or phenomenal. Second, he relied exclusively on a causal framework, assuming that every new idea is triggered by external, objective factors or physiological processes in nerve centers. By doing so, Nietzsche avoided addressing how truly new phenomena can emerge from pre-existing conditions, instead hypostatizing the eternal return of the same. In contrast, the author asserts that recognizing the emergence of novelty within both objective reality and subjectivity is essential. The text concludes that a purely objective reality is a mental construct, a point Nietzsche himself occasionally acknowledged. This analysis highlights the limitations of Nietzsche’s deterministic approach and emphasizes the need to account for the arrival of the new in human consciousness and the broader world.
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◆ philosophical diary – record, Czech, origin: 2004 – srpen
- This is a part of the original document:
- 2004