This text explores the problem of objectual and non-objectual intentions, a subject that spans various philosophical disciplines due to its inherent complexity. The author highlights that both intentionality and objecthood possess multiple focal points, allowing for diverse methodological approaches based on different strategic or systematic motives. The primary focus is established within the realm of philosophical logic. To justify this perspective, the author defines its relationship with, and necessary distance from, psychology as well as traditional and modern formal logic. The central argument is that neither psychology nor modern logic possesses the conceptual tools required to adequately address the problem of conceptual thinking in its entirety. While philosophical analysis may draw upon insights from these fields, it must inevitably transcend them to reach a comprehensive solution. The text thus advocates for the unique role of philosophical logic in investigating structures that exceed psychic processes or formal schemas, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of non-objectual intentions within the broader framework of philosophy as a whole.