This paper provides a profound ontological examination of the relationship between the categories of being and non-being, based on the provided philosophical fragment. The author starts from the primary thesis that anything that exists is automatically defined as a being. Consequently, anything non-existent appears necessarily as non-being, a concept that immediately triggers several logical paradoxes. When we speak of non-being and assign it a name, we seem to grant it a certain quality of existence within our intellectual framework. The text attempts to analyze the limits of human language and logic in the effort to grasp what is absent from the material world. It discusses whether non-being is merely an empty concept or whether it represents a distinct category essential for understanding reality as a whole. This issue refers back to the classical philosophical tradition that seeks to reconcile the existence of void or nothingness with the principles of formal logic. The aim of this abstract is to highlight the tension between the semantic designation of non-existence and its ontological status within the context of human knowledge and the description of the world as a whole.
Nebýt „jsoucnem“
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◆ philosophical diary – record, Czech, origin: 1. 10. 2018
- This is a part of the original document:
- 2018
Nebýt „jsoucnem“
O všem, co „jest“, říkáme, že to je „jsoucno“; jsoucno, které „není“, se nám jeví jako nesmysl: co není, nemůže být „jsoucnem“. A tak musíme přistoupit k tomu, že to, co není jsoucnem, je zřejmě nejsoucnem. Ale jak potom můžeme o nejsoucnu říci, že v nějakém smyslu přece jenom „jest“?
(Písek, 181001-3.)