This text offers a critical reflection on the concept of the transcendent, specifically addressing the definition provided by Teodor Münz in his commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The author challenges the characterization of the transcendent as that which exists "beyond the limits of knowledge," arguing that if something were truly beyond such limits, it could not even be theorized. The discussion explores the nature of human knowledge, noting that it never directly touches external reality and that an identification between the thinking subject and the object of thought is impossible. Drawing on Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the text distinguishes between immanent and transcendent realities, while introducing the specific category of intentional objects. The author argues that although intentional objects, such as geometric shapes, are constituted by subjective acts, they are not immanent components of those acts. Ultimately, the text emphasizes the necessity of strictly distinguishing between intentional objects and "real" objects, contributing to the broader philosophical debate on subjectivity and the boundaries of cognition.