This text examines the ontological distinction between a word, understood as a sign, and a concept. The author argues that a word stripped of its meaning becomes a mere sign, which does not demonstrate or grasp anything on its own, but only designates based on the user's intent. In contrast, a concept is defined as an active act of grasping or conceiving that is inseparable from the thinking subject. While a sign can persist through time as an external trace, such as a group of sounds or letters, even without being actively used, a concept ceases to exist entirely without the ongoing mental activity of the subject. The abstract emphasizes that a concept is not a static entity but a dynamic activity that leaves no external trace unless it is subsequently encoded or expressed in language. Ultimately, the text highlights the fundamental difference between the objective, external nature of signs and the subjective, processual nature of concepts, stressing the concept's absolute dependence on the conscious act of grasping and the subject's activity.