This paper explores the distinction between traditional and new ontology, focusing on the conceptualization of universals and forms. Old ontology characterizes intentional models of beings, such as Platonic ideas or Aristotelian forms, as truly "being" and "acting" entities. These forms are seen as formative powers that maintain unity and identity within a changing multiplicity. In contrast, the new ontology, which the author terms "meontology," introduces a radical paradigm shift. Here, ideas and forms are no longer understood as beings or active faculties but are radically defined as "non-being" (me on) in a very specific sense. The text analyzes how this shift redefines the relationship between conceptual models and material reality. Moving away from substance-based metaphysics, meontology suggests that the principles organizing our world do not possess the status of being. The abstract highlights the transition from viewing forms as immutable formative powers to understanding them as constitutive yet non-existent principles, marking a significant evolution in ontological thought.