This text examines the philosophical prerequisites necessary for a meaningful conceptualization of "freedom." The author identifies two fundamental conditions for freedom to be possible. First, the principle of pan-causality must be rejected in favor of the view that a developing situation does not have a single, predetermined outcome but remains open to multiple possibilities. Second, there must be a source capable of active intervention to influence this process. This source is defined as the "subject." The subject cannot be classified simply as one of the objects within a situation; instead, its reality and existence must be recognized as having a non-objective "inner self" that functions as an autonomous source of action. As a source of initiative, the subject is not merely an effect of prior causes. The reflection emphasizes that without acknowledging these ontological premises—the openness of events and the non-objective nature of subjectivity—any discourse on freedom remains philosophically groundless. Freedom is thus inextricably linked to the subject's capacity to intervene in an undetermined flow of events.