This text critically examines Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself," which the author deems internally contradictory and practically unusable. Kant's assertion that the thing-in-itself is unknowable because the act of knowing would necessarily transform it into a "thing-for-us" is identified as a truism that undermines the very nature and purpose of the cognitive process. The author argues against this view, stating that the unknown is fundamentally knowable, although such knowledge is achieved through a gradual and long-term process of overcoming ignorance that may span generations. The distinction between the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us remains legitimate, not due to an inherent unknowability, but because of the multitude of aspects an object possesses, some of which may be deemed irrelevant or dispensable in a given context. Ultimately, the text concludes that knowledge of the "thing-in-itself" is indeed possible and can be truthful, even though it always remains relative and partial.