The text examines the nature of concepts and their relationship to thought and external reality. The author argues that although concepts are inherently tied to the process of thinking, they possess a degree of autonomy because they point toward other concepts and external "things" (res). These things constitute the factual "background" of concepts, preventing thinking from being reduced to mere subjectivity. Thinking is thus inextricably linked to realities that are not inherently part of the mind nor primarily dependent on it. While thought can retroactively influence this background, it can only do so indirectly. A crucial aspect of this relationship is the connection of mental activities with the physical actions of the subject. It is through physical performance, which cannot be reduced to purely mental acts, that thought actively engages with the external sphere. Concepts therefore serve as a bridge between subjective consciousness and objective reality, where their validity is conditioned by the integration of thought into a broader framework of human activity.