This study offers a critical reflection on the concept of self-identity as formulated by Paul Ricoeur in his Prague lecture. The author challenges the traditional essentialist understanding of substance, which views identity as an unchanging element guaranteeing the unity of a being from atoms to complex organisms. The text argues that the guarantor of identity cannot be found within the objective dimension of a whole; instead, it is necessary to acknowledge an internal, non-objective, or subjective aspect of every individual being. It is precisely this capacity for self-relation that forms the foundation of identity. Special attention is given to a critique of Ricoeur’s emphasis on memory as the constitutive element of the permanence of the self. The author contends that memory is not an independent entity but rather an act of a subject that must already be primarily identical with itself. Thus, identity precedes memory rather than resulting from it. The paper concludes by disagreeing with the notion that continuity of existence and self-permanence are ensured primarily by memory, advocating for a deeper ontological investigation of subjectivity.