This text provides a critical reflection on the terminological treatment of time within contemporary philosophical discourse, specifically responding to Yitzhak Melamed’s work on Hegel, Spinoza, and McTaggart. The primary argument focuses on the inappropriateness of using the term "reality" in connection with time. The author emphasizes the etymological root of the word "reality," which derives from the Latin "res," meaning "thing." Since time is clearly not a "thing" but rather a "non-thing," labeling its nature as "reality" is misleading and indicates a lack of conceptual precision among modern authors. Instead, the text suggests using terms such as "actuality" or "truthfulness." Time and temporal changes are not mere illusions; they occur "actually" or "truly," necessitating a more precise linguistic definition that captures the ontological nature of temporality outside the framework of thingness. This reflection calls for greater rigor in philosophical language and rejects the superficial adoption of established yet unsuitable phrases in the study of temporal events.