This text presents a critical analysis of Ferdinand Ebner’s proposition that science is the product of external necessity, whereas metaphysics arises from internal need. While acknowledging the symmetry of this analogy, the author warns against a simplistic reduction of metaphysics to a mere byproduct of psychological distress or fear. The primary critique is directed at Ebner’s assumption that this internal need is a static, ahistorical constant of human existence, remaining unchanged from the dawn of philosophy until the end of humanity. The author questions why such a need would not be subject to historical transformations if it is fundamentally linked to human history. He argues that internal need is inherently historical and, therefore, subject to continuous change. Due to its internal nature, it is likely even more fluid and variable than external needs. The text concludes that Ebner’s position is untenable because it fails to account for the essential historicity of internal need, which must be understood as a dynamic rather than a fixed element of the human condition.