This paper critiques the traditional notion that a concept is merely a refined mental representation or image. The author emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between the act of thinking (cogitatio cogitans) and the object of thought (cogitatio cogitatum). While the term "concept" is retained for the active act of conceiving, the author proposes the term "intentional model" or "construct" for that which is conceived. This distinction allows for a more precise comparison: it is the intentional model, rather than the concept itself, that functions as a refined representation. Consequently, one must differentiate between the act of representing and the content represented. The text argues that conceptualization is the process through which a thinker clarifies their "thought-content" (cogitatum) through mental activity. A key conclusion is that neither the acts of representing nor the acts of conceiving can be described from an external, objective perspective, as they are inherent activities of thought directed toward intentional models.