This text explores the philosophical concept of intentional non-objects, which the author positions as the next major intellectual challenge following the long-standing debate over intentional objects. Just as it took millennia for philosophy, specifically through Husserl, to realize that an intentional object is not a constituent part of the intentional act itself, the author suggests that a similar lengthy development awaits the understanding of non-objects. The core thesis posits that intentional non-objects cannot be derived from human subjectivity or the intentional acts of the subject. This perspective challenges traditional phenomenological frameworks and suggests that the future of intellectual progress depends on detaching these non-objects from the sphere of the subject. The text emphasizes that our current understanding is only at the beginning of this realization. By highlighting the independence of non-objects from the act of intention, the author calls for a radical shift in ontological thinking that transcends the limitations of subjectivity, a task that may take centuries or even millennia to fully mature in human thought.